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HEDGEHOGS OR FOXES?: A REVIEW OF 
WESTEN'S AND SCHLEIDER'S ZIVILRECHT 
IM SYSTEM VER GLEICH 
Inga Markovits* 
I 
If one were to play the game of dividing legal academics into 
hedgehogs and foxes, most comparative lawyers would be easy to 
place. They would clearly be foxes. Comparativists do not know 
one big thing, but many things. Unlike their colleagues from the 
Chicago law-and-economics school, for instance, who structure all 
their arguments around one concept, evaluate all evidence in its 
light alone-typical hedgehogs!-comparative lawyers are happily 
indiscriminate in their search for information. They assemble evi- 
dence not only in one or two fields, like their colleagues specializing 
in torts or tax law, but across many areas of law; not just within one 
country's legal system, but across national borders and ideological 
divides. Comparative lawyers tend to be gatherers: they collect in- 
formation wherever they can, compare notes at conferences around 
the globe, then bring home what they discovered abroad and add it 
to their larder of facts. They like exhaustive treatises covering a 
subject from every conceivable angle;' encyclopedias bringing to- 
gether the knowledge of experts from all over the world.2 They are 
finders and keepers, treasure hunters rejoicing in the variety of de- 
tail. No data are insignificant, no facts too small to escape their 
amazing attention. 
The book under review in many ways is an archetypical foxes' 
book. Klaus Westen's and Joachim Schleider's Zivilrecht im Sys- 
temvergleich3 is a handbook on East and West German civil law: a 
comprehensive and scrupulous synopsis of all areas covered by the 
* Professor of Law, University of Texas. 
1. E.g., Schlesinger (ed.), Formation of Contracts, 2 vols. (1968). 
2. E.g., International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, Encyclopedia of Soviet 
Law, 2 vols. (2d ed. 1985). 
3. Westen & Schleider, Zivilrecht im Systemvergleich, Osteuropa Institut an 
der Freien Universitat Berlin, Rechtswissenschaftliche Ver6ffentlichungen, vol. 13 
(1984). All page citations without further reference will refer to this book. 
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German Civil Code of 1900, still in force (though much amended) in 
West Germany, and the new East German Civil Code of 1975. It is 
an impressive piece of work: sensibly organized, well written, care- 
fully documented. Even as a paperback it weighs solidly in the 
hand: 864 pages, 2488 footnotes, 300 bibliographical references since 
1975. For anyone wanting to compare the state of civil law on both 
sides of the German Wall, it offers a useful and reliable source of 
information. 
But as its title suggests, the book seeks to go beyond the genre 
of an ordinary foxes' compendium. "Zivilrecht im Systemver- 
gleich"-a comparison of systems, a systematic evaluation of the 
civil law in both states-not only focuses on what is but intends to 
ask questions going beyond the mere surface of the law. In the au- 
thors' words, they want to uncover "the basic structures", "the sys- 
temic relevance" of the civil law systems of both German states; 
they want to show the law in "its dependence on the underlying 
political, social and economic conditions."4 That implies looking for 
unifying principles, for those essential characteristics which make a 
capitalist legal system "capitalist" and a socialist legal system "so- 
cialist". Such an investigation requires a concentration of thought, a 
single focus, a hedgehog's perspective. It requires looking for the 
one thing rather than the many, for the one thing in the many: that 
common denominator which determines the peculiar characteristics 
of capitalist or socialist law. 
For such a "comparison of systems" the authors could not have 
chosen better objects of study. East and West Germany offer a 
unique laboratory setting for investigating the impact of different 
political structures and economic organizations on law. Nowhere 
else in the world could one find two sophisticated legal systems so 
similar in all respects other than their adherence to opposed polit- 
ical ideologies. East and West Germany share the same historical 
and legal past, similar levels of industrial development, similar types 
of populations, and the same civilist approach to law. If indeed 
there should exist peculiar "socialist" and "capitalist" strands of 
legal thought and practice, the German setting should be the place 
to discover and isolate them. 
Nevertheless, at least from a hedgehog's perspective, the result 
of the authors' efforts is disappointing. Despite its ambitious design, 
the book lacks a hedgehog's urgency of purpose, its intellectual sin- 
glemindedness. The authors handle their data well. There are 
many nice points, many instances in which we are convinced by a 
particular interpretation. But the insights do not connect to form, in 
the end, a convincing picture of the whole. When we put the book 
down, we are left with more questions than answers. Why is a work 
of this range, by authors who can build on long experience, have 
great command of their facts, and show sensitive judgment so unsat- 
isfying in the end? Why is so much of comparative law work so un- 
4. P. 35. 
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satisfying in general? Why are we so often left with a sense of great 
learning but no enlightenment, no real "aha"-experiences, which 
change the ways in which we perceive the law's impact on people's 
lives? 
The reasons why this "comparison of systems" falls short of our 
expectations are typical, I believe, for the reasons why we compara- 
tivists so often get into trouble if we want to do a hedgehog's job. 
The problem begins already with our "comparative method". Com- 
parativists tend to be proud of this method. But examined more 
closely, it does not offer much methodological help by itself. It sim- 
ply suggests attacking legal problems by looking at several legal sys- 
tems rather than only one. But like comparative law in general, the 
"comparative method" is indiscriminate:5 it teaches us how to look 
closely and systematically at whatever we choose to examine, but it 
does not tell us why we should look, what we should look for, and 
how to make sense of our findings. Guided by the "comparative 
method", we are good at placing information into proper doctrinal 
slots, at comparing the technicalities of different legal regulations, 
and if we are progressive, even at exploring the functional differ- 
ences and similarities between two legal systems. But we are not 
very good at asking questions going beyond that. The "comparative 
method" cannot relieve us of the task of formulating hypotheses and 
devising research plans.6 But comparativists often seem to believe 
that it does. 
Take the project at hand, for instance. If one wanted to use the 
civil law systems of both German states as a basis for uncovering the 
essential features of socialist and capitalist law, respectively, how 
could one go about it? One method might be to reflect upon the un- 
derlying economic and political systems, speculate about the ways in 
which the political essentials of capitalism and socialism (market vs. 
planned economy, pluralism vs. democratic centralism, etc.) might 
affect the function of civil law, and check the actual working of both 
codes against our assumptions. This approach would have the ad- 
vantage of forcing us to articulate our expectations about both legal 
systems and to develop hypotheses which would guide our further 
investigation. It would also have the disadvantage of requiring mas- 
tery of a virtually boundless mass of information. To understand 
the political and economic systems of capitalism and socialism well 
5. See, for instance, Gutteridge, Comparative Law (2nd ed. 1949): "The funda- 
mental characteristic of comparative law, viewed as a method, lies in the fact that it 
is applicable to any form of legal research. The method is equally at the service of 
the legal historian, the analytical jurist, the practitioner and the teacher of law... 
Not the least of its merits is its flexibility. . ." (at 10). And: "The comparative 
method is sufficiently elastic to embrace all activities which, in some form or other, 
may be concerned with the study of foreign law" (at 7). 
6. See Kahn-Freund, "Comparative Law as an Academic Subject," 82 Law Q. 
Rev. 40, 41 (1966): "A comparative lawyer must make many decisions entirely for 
himself; decisions on the field he wishes to cultivate, and decisions on the tools and 
implements he wishes to use in cultivating it. More than that: he must set out on a 
voyage of discovery to find the field and on another voyage to find the tools." 
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enough to formulate intelligent hypotheses and to measure those 
hypotheses against the entire civil law systems of both states seems 
a task of gigantic proportions. 
A more modest way of attacking the job would be to start at the 
opposite end: to compare not whole "systems" but individual mani- 
festations of these systems. This way was chosen by Marx, who de- 
veloped his analysis of capitalism by examning its smallest 
components (like price or profit), and by Pashukanis, who built his 
study of capitalist law on the dissection of what he believed to be its 
smallest parts (the juridical person and his manner of relating to 
other juridical persons through contracts). We might imitate this 
approach and explore the differences between capitalist and socialist 
civil law by focusing, on both sides, on the structure and function 
either of a few central concepts such as contracts or private law 
rights or, better yet, of specific contracts or rights, such as rent con- 
tracts or buyers' rights. Such an approach would have the advan- 
tage of being both narrow and general: the field of investigation 
would be limited to manageable proportions, but our purpose would 
go beyond the mere subject under review and we would be able to 
draw overall conclusions about the specific characteristics of socialist 
and capitalist law. However, this method would be based on an as- 
sumption which strikes me as persuasive but which might not be 
shared by many comparativists: namely, that all elements of a legal 
system reflect its essential features; that each individual part, so to 
speak, repeats the genetic make-up of the whole; and that if we can 
crack this genetic code, we will understand the system in its 
entirety. 
A third method might reject any a priori notions about what to 
expect from "socialist" or "capitalist" law in general, or about any 
internal logic of legal systems, and instead start out with the evi- 
dence. We might simply accumulate as much information as possi- 
ble about both legal systems and see whether we can make any 
particular sense of it. This is the method a comparativist is most 
likely to choose. It suits our encyclopedic curiosity, our openmind- 
edness, our foxy inclination to see many things. But it also has the 
disadvantage of not providing us with any hypotheses or analytic 
guidelines to distinguish or even recognize what we see: we simply 
stare long and hard at our facts until they seem to fall into a pat- 
tern. If most of our evidence fits into this pattern, we will be satis- 
fied. If not, we have to rearrange things for a better fit. 
II 
Although not articulated, Westen's and Schleider's way of at- 
tacking their "Systemvergleich" most closely resembles this third 
approach. They suggest no specific methodology for investigating 
the relationship between legal and social systems. They present no 
hypothesis about how and why socialist civil law should differ from 
capitalist civil law, which they then set out to prove on the basis of 
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their evidence. Instead, the authors collect information on the state 
of the law on both sides, arrange it by subject matter concerning 
similar types of transactions, and lead us, topic by topic, through the 
accumulated evidence, pausing whenever a particular feature ap- 
pears which we seem to have encountered before. 
Some readers will disagree with this characterization. The book 
does indeed contain two introductory chapters outlining the differ- 
ent scope of civil law regulation in East and West Germany and 
describing, in conceptual terms, what the authors perceive to be the 
different functions of civil law under both systems.7 These chapters 
reflect certain theoretical convictions, which I will exam- ine at a 
later point. But they do not set the stage for the following investiga- 
tion. They outline no research strategies and spell out no assump- 
tions. Rather, they state categorical assertions about the special 
quality of socialist civil law which are unrelated to the material that 
follows and are not summarized at the end. Throughout the main 
body of the book's text, we thus never experience a developing argu- 
ment, advancing step-by-step from hypothesis to result. Rather, we 
get an explanation or an enlightening aside whenever our progress 
through the material provides a suitable occasion. Any understand- 
ing we have gained from the book at the end does not seem to be 
based on a process of reasoning but on largely spontaneous insights, 
founded on the accumulated experience of people who for years 
have worked and written in the field and thus cannot help but per- 
ceive certain recurrent features and patterns. 
It is true, of course, that it would have been exceedingly diffi- 
cult to construct a complex, gradually unfolding argument within 
the framework of a handbook. But the authors chose this format 
themselves; they apparently saw no conflict between exhaustive de- 
scriptiveness and analytic acuity and no need to pull together the 
numarous strands of their narrative with a tight analytic structure 
or a theoretical summary at the end. A handbook requires a 
breadth of coverage which must be paid for with a loss of depth; its 
comprehensiveness implies the refusal to sort out the wheat of sig- 
nificant data from the chaff of mere facts; proximity to detail is 
achieved at the cost of critical distance. The very format of the book 
thus not only poses special expositional problems but betrays a cer- 
tain ambivalence about the project itself. If the authors did not rec- 
ognize the difficulty of being both choosy and all-embracing, both 
hedgehog and fox at the same time, it may be because they did not 
properly size up the analytic job before them. 
In the following pages, I want to examine the outcome of their 
efforts in order to learn from what I believe to be their mistakes. If 
this sounds like a negative enterprise, it is not meant to be. I have 
great respect for the project and its authors, have learned a lot from 
the book, and will no doubt use it often in the future. But I also 
7. Chs. 1 and 3, dealing (in somewhat puzzling order) with the function of civil 
law under the two systems (ch. 1) and the substantive definition of civil law (ch. 3). 
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think that both they and we can do better if we become aware of our 
own limitations. A critical look at what went wrong in a particular 
case seems a good way of doing so. For this purpose, I will first de- 
scribe the results of this book and outline, with specific examples, 
the kind of questions raised by its arguments. I will then pull to- 
gether and analyze what I take to be the major reasons for the 
book's specific weaknesses. And finally, I will extend my critique to 
comparative law work in general. 
III 
To give a survey of the theoretical results of this book, a re- 
viewer must necessarily collect and choose the main points herself; 
the authors-more occupied with the task of writing a handbook 
than a Systemvergleich-have not done so. With one exception: 
they spend considerable time on the definition of "civil law" under 
both systems. Since the subject matters dealt with by the BGB and 
the ZGB overlap only partially, the authors had to decide which top- 
ics to cover in the first place. For this purpose, they engage in de- 
tailed deliberations to determine, for instance, whether family or 
labor law (both regulated, at least partially, by the BGB in West 
Germany but by special legislation in East Germany) are indeed civil 
law and should be included in their comparison.8 To someone raised 
in a common law system, these Abgrenzungsfragen must have a very 
scholastic ring (in many instances, a quick arbitrary decision-yes or 
no-might have done just as well). But to the authors, these ques- 
tions have more than just practical meaning: they reflect the es- 
sence of civil law itself. 
Accordingly, the book begins by delineating the different sub- ject matters covered by the two civil codes. The dissimilarity is in- 
deed substantial. While the West German BGB applies to all 
horizontal exchange relationships on the market and thus includes 
interactions between enterprises as well as between individuals, the 
East German ZGB regulates only exchanges between individuals or 
between individuals and their suppliers, whether private or state- 
owned. West German civil law thus presupposes the formal equality 
of all legal subjects engaging in horizontal transactions, whether or- 
dinary people or businesses; East German law distingiishes between 
individuals and enterprises: only individual transactions are gov- 
erned by civil law, whereas relationships between state-owned en- 
terprises fall under a special branch of law called "economic law". 
The West German BGB could be called a "market code", while the 
East German ZGB might be called a "people's code". 
These distinctions seem clearly reflected in the very different 
style of both codes. Throughout the book, the authors draw our at- 
tention to these matters of legislative technique. The BGB appears 
plodding, exhaustive, obsessed with doctrinal consistency and techni- 
8. Ch. 2. 
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cal minutiae, far removed from ordinary life experiences-a lawyer's 
code. The ZGB, by contrast, is practical, accessible, short, almost 
contemptuous of detail, cutting through dogma to regulate issues in- 
stead in clusters of actual life situations, easy to read and eager to be 
understood-a citizen's code. The two codes seem to speak to very 
different audiences: the BGB, to the autonomous burgher, maximniz- 
ing his self-defined interests in the market; the ZGB, to a member of 
the collective, taking care of his daily needs while leaving all eco- 
nomic activities to the state. 
And finally, the unequal subject matters and audiences of ZGB 
and BGB seem to betray the very different purposes of the two civil 
law systems. Again, the authors point to these divergent purposes 
on many occasions, but I will paraphrase and draw their remarks to- 
gether for the sake of the argument. West German civil law, we are 
told, balances private interests; East German civil law focuses above 
all on the realization of societal interests.9 West German law wants 
to resolve the individual conflicts of private right holders; East Ger- 
man law primarily wants to prevent conflict in the interest of the 
collective.10 West German law wants to protect individual rights; 
East German law wants to realize social goals."1 
All this sounds extremely persuasive. I have myself outlined 
similar distinctions on earlier occasions.12 But if we look more 
closely, a number of questions arise. Let us begin with the different 
subject matters covered by the two codes. West German law, the 
book tells us, by seeing all civil law actors as potential entrepre- 
neurs, preserves the formal equality of all civil law subjects, 
whether private or businesses.13 East German law, on the other 
hand, by distinguishing between a civil law for ordinary citizens and 
an economic law for state-owned enterprises, has renounced this for- 
mal equality not only by creating a special socialist business law but 
also by differentiating between the rights and liabilities of individu- 
als and state-owned firms in the civil code itself.'4 But is this dis- 
tinction really so crucial? Would we not have to look at the actual 
resolution of business conflicts under West German civil law and 
East German economic law before we can make any assertions as to 
the similarity or dissimilarity of the two bodies of law? And for that 
matter, does West German civil law really treat businesses and citi- 
zens as formally equal? Have not strict liability, products liability, 
protected tenancy, the regulation of contracts of adhesion and the 
like under capitalist law, too, given recognition to the fact that indi- 
vidual citizens and businesses, however formally equal, in real life 
have quite unequal powers, interests and capacities to respond? And 
9. E.g., at pp. 370, 374, 682. 
10. E.g., at pp. 130, 502, 574. 
11. E.g., at pp. 388, 573, 592. 
12. Markovits, "Socialist vs. Bourgeois Rights," 46 Univ. Chicago L. Rev. 612 (1978). 
13. P. 53. 
14. P. 61, 408. 
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how important is the BGB in affecting relationships between busi- 
ness partners? Does not special legislation on business associations, 
restrictive practices, secured transactions, etc.-a capitalist economic 
law all outside the BGB-have far greater impact than the civil 
code? And finally: the Soviet Civil Law Fundamentals, passed at a 
time when the "civilist" approach to economic relations seemed a 
promising way to encourage managerial initiative, do in fact apply to 
state-owned enterprises as well as to citizens (just like the BGB) if 
no special regulations apply. Does that mean that Soviet civil law is 
more "capitalist" than East German civil law? Obviously not. Obvi- 
ously it cannot matter that much whether a particular area of legal 
regulation is labeled "civil" or "economic" law. But then the fact 
that the BGB and the ZGB address very different groups of legal 
subjects cannot be that significant either. We cannot draw reliable 
conclusions about the two systems' views of legal man from the for- 
mal organization of their respective civil codes alone. 
Or take some of the authors' examples illustrating the different 
function of socialist and capitalist civil law. When talking about 
legal capacity, for instance, the authors stress the fact that under the 
BGB the capacity to be a bearer of rights is an unlimited and auto- 
matic attribute of every human being, while under the ZGB this ca- 
pacity is not inborn but assigned by the state and limited only to 
those rights specifically listed by law.15 This distinction is seen as an 
affirmation of the different ideological persuasions of the two codes: 
the BGB is individualistic, honoring the autonomy of every person; 
the ZGB is collectivist, seeing the citizen primarily as a creature of 
society. But again, does this dogmatic distinction lead to different 
result in practice? Even the authors have doubts.16 In fact, I cannot 
think of a single situation in which a GDR citizen cannot hold a 
right only for lack of a general inborn legal capacity, while a West 
German citizen can hold a right only because of it. Under both sys- 
tems, rights can be held and protected only on the basis of specific 
legal assignments. Doctrinal distinctions about legal capacity have 
at best symbolic significance. 
The same holds true for many other characteristically "social- 
ist" or "capitalist" features which the authors point out to us. 
Throughout the book, for instance, they assemble evidence on the 
preventive character of East German civil law and contrast it with 
West German civil law, which allegedly is not primarily concerned 
with the prevention, but rather with the resolution, of conflicts. 
Again, this distinction is taken as a reflection of the different ideo- 
logical thrust of both systems: the BGB is concerned with the indi- 
vidual, wanting to give each his due; the ZGB is concerned with 
society, trying to keep the collective peace. A good deal of verbal ev- 
idence can be collected to support this distinction. The ZGB con- 
tains many general admonitions: for instance, the duty to "respect 
15. P. 197-98. 
16. P. 198. 
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societal needs and to observe the rules of socialist life together'17 or 
the duty to refrain from causing society or fellow citizens any dam- 
age.'8 Similarly, it gives special expression to the general socialist 
duty of being one's brother's keeper by articulating a number of spe- 
cific, related obligations: for instance, the obligation of state-owned 
travel agencies to carefully inform and advise prospective 
travelers.'9 
However, as the authors admit themselves (although only par- 
tially and reluctantly),20 these admonitions, standing alone, have no 
legal significance. No civil law consequences face an East German 
citizen who does not observe the rules of socialist life unless he also 
violates specific duties or rights, causes damage to a neighbor's prop- 
erty, or violates a legal obligation to act. And if the State Travel 
Agency fails its obligation to assist a citizen with counseling and in- 
formation, it will be liable for any resulting damage only if the mis- 
information was part of the contract between agency and client.2' If 
East German civil law is actually applied to concrete cases, it ap- 
pears to play the same role as West German law in similar circum- 
stances, such as redressing grievances or balancing individual 
interests. Its special preventive function, so stressed by the authors, 
again seems large symbolic in nature: the ZGB teaches and admon- 
ishes, but it does not follow up on its lessons unless individual rights 
are involved. But if that is so, does it still make sense to contrast 
socialist conflict prevention with capitalist conflict resolution? And 
does not the BGB, by specifying the legal consequences of individual 
misbehavior, also try to prevent conflicts? And to go a step further: 
how are we going to assess the impact of either code on the fre- 
quency of conflict in the two societies? Can socialist law prevent 
conflict by preventing litigation? Does the protection of individual 
rights reduce or increase conflicts? Can either ZGB or the BGB tell 
us anything at all about social peace under the two systems? 
The authors do not ask any of these questions. Although they 
admit on a number of occasions that certain distinctive characteris- 
tics of East or West German civil law are of little or no practical sig- 
nificance, they do not seem bothered by the largely symbolic nature 
of their findings. The reason lies in their peculiar understanding of 
"law". By "law" Westen and Schleider mean the law of the books. 
This is a comparison of codes. The authors cite very little case law; 
if they do list an occasional decision,22 it is not to let us know what 
the courts do in real life, but to confirm a particular doctrinal inter- 
pretation of the statute. We hear nothing about the legal profession, 
litigation rates, alternative ways of dispute resolution; nothing, for 
17. ? 13 ZGB. 
18. ? 324 ZGB. 
19. ? 205 ZGB. 
20. P. 617. 
21. P. 502. 
22. Primarily in the paragraphs dealing with the liability of sellers of defective 
merchandise, pp. 421-447. 
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instance, about the very significant differences between ordinary 
courts and dispute commissions, both of whom apply civil law rules; 
nothing even about socialist civil procedure. "The underlying polit- 
ical, social, and economic conditions", which the authors have set out 
to reveal, are only those which may have found reflection in the 
wording (not in the application or non-application) of the two civil 
codes. 
It is true that in socialist countries any investigation going be- 
yond the mere letter of the law meets with many difficulties. Cases 
are not consistently published, legal statistics are largely unavaila- 
ble, and survey research and field work just about impossible. It is 
therefore tempting to restrict one's analysis to the much more acces- 
sible law of the books. But the authors do not view these limitations 
on research as a significant shortcoming. To them, the code is the 
law. This perception seriously curtails their vision and blocks ques- 
tions from mind which have to be asked, if one wants to understand 
how the function of civil law in the two countries is affected by dif- 
ferences in social organization. 
This is not to say that an analysis of the mere text of both codes 
would be a pointless enterprise. Both the BGB and the ZGB, after 
all, were written in the belief that they would affect relationships 
governed by their rules, and if disputes come to court, the codes will 
be one important factor in their resolution. The text of the law can 
at least be read as a revealing statement of the powers-that-be about 
what is considered to be of value in a particular society; what they 
expect of its citizens; how they would like their society to see itself. 
But we must remember that the portrait thus revealed is an ideal- 
ized portrait not necessarily resembling the sitter. Especially in a 
socialist state, where the legislative process is more removed from 
majority opinion than in a bourgeois democracy, we have reason to 
doubt its accuracy. But under capitalism, as well, countless social in- 
fluences come between the law and real life and distort the likeness 
which any code can give of the society it claims to depict. We never 
can be sure that what the law says bears much of a resemblance to 
what actually happens to people. 
The authors don't share these doubts. Take, for instance, their 
treatment of the so-called allgemeines Pers6nlichkeitsrecht under 
the two systems.23 Both East and West German law recognize a 
right to personal integrity, which offers protection against interfer- 
ence with one's name, picture, reputation, or other aspects of indi- 
viduality. In both countries, the "personality" is recognized in 
constitutional provisions (art. 1, 2 constitution FRG; art. 19, 30 con- 
stitution GDR). Under West German civil law, the BGB itself pro- 
tects only the right to one's name, but many other ramifications of 
the "personality right" have since been developed by case law 
(building primarily on the constitution and on the BGB provisions 
23. P. 626 ff. 
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dealing with compensation for pain and suffering).24 In East Ger- 
many, the "personality right" is protected expressly by ? 7 ZGB.25 
From this the authors conclude that "congruity exists so far be- 
tween both legal systems of compensation-a fact however, which 
cannot surprise since (personality rights) concern elementary values 
which every legal order must protect without reservation."26 
But this statement is patently misleading. The living law on the 
protection of individuality under the two systems is simply worlds 
apart. Under West German civil law, the "personality right" serves 
primarily to protect individual privacy by providing injunctions and, 
under certain circumstances, financial compensation for reprehensi- 
ble interferences with a person's private life. The huge body of case 
law which developed around this Personlichkeitsrecht could be used 
as a model example to demonstrate the particular strengths and 
weaknesses of capitalist law: its respect for the individual, the thor- 
oughness of its judicial protection, but also its Midas-touch, mani- 
fested in its readiness to measure personal intimacy in terms of 
money or to protect the wealthy who have a reputation to protect, a 
private life interesting enough to be invaded, more effectively than 
the anonymous poor. 
Under East German law, on the other hand, no civil court case 
defines the ZGB's boundaries of individual privacy (at least, none is 
known to me and none is cited by the authors). Nor is such case law 
likely to develop, since as the authors point out themselves, the ZGB 
allows no monetary compensation for the infringement of non-mate- 
rial interests.27 Disputes concerning violations of personal honor 
and reputation, quite frequent in the GDR, involve almost exclu- 
sively quarrels between neighbors and acquaintances and are han- 
dled by dispute commissions: lay tribunals, deliberating cases before 
neighborhood audiences in an atmosphere more conducive to the vi- 
olation of privacy than to its protection. No practical constitutional 
protection of privacy exists in the GDR, which knows no judicial re- 
view of administrative acts and thus could never develop the kind of 
case law which in West Germany, building on art. 2 of the Basic 
Law, was so influential in encouraging the private law protection of 
personal intimacy. And finally, although East German courts do 
safeguard the fruits of individual creativity (like inventions and 
copyrights), this case law is much better understood as a socialist at- 
tempt to reward inventiveness through economic incentives than as 
a commitment to the legal protection of personal individuality, as ? 7 
ZGB seems to suggest. Despite the wording of the code, privacy has 
no legal value in everyday East German life (although it does, of 
24. See Palandt, Buirgerliches Gesetzbuch, ? 823, 15 (40th ed., 1980). 
25. ? 7 ZGB: "Every citizen is entitled to the respect of his personality, in partic- 
ular his honor and reputation, his name, his picture, his rights as an author, and 
other similarly protected rights arising from his creative activity." 
26. P. 635. 
27. P. 666. 
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course, have great human value). As this example shows, the letter 
of the law can be thoroughly misleading. 
IV 
But even if we accept the authors' limited vision and assume 
that we can make meaningful comparisons between the two civil 
law systems on the basis of their written law alone, we run into 
trouble. Sure, many rules are different on either side of the bor- 
der-some of them unimportant, many of them quite important. 
But are they different in a way which throws light on the underly- 
ing social systems? If we learn, for example, that under West Ger- 
man law protection of tenancy (Mieterschutz) is enjoyed only by 
tenants who comply with their contractual obligations, while under 
East German law even defaulting tenants cannot simply be given no- 
tice but can be evicted only on the basis of a court decision,28 we are 
persuaded by the authors' explanation: that the distinction is due to 
the different function of civil law under both systems. In the West, 
we are told, the law protects primarily horizontal equity between 
two parties and therefore must take note of the unilateral violation 
of the contract by one side. In the East, on the other hand, the law 
is less interested in the balancing of private interests than in the ac- 
comodation of all who need housing. Since every evicted tenant 
would have to be assigned housing elsewhere, it lies in society's in- 
terest to at least investigate whether he is not best left where he 
is.29 
But a similar explanation is less persuasive on other occasions. 
Take the effect of violations of price regulations, for instance. 
Under West German law, the buyer of a car who paid a higher price 
than official price regulations permitted (assuming their existence) 
could not later retrieve the excess amount: the contract would be 
illegal and therefore void, but the BGB's chapter on unjust enrich- 
ment offers no protection to someone who himself violated the law 
and would leave the parties where it found them. Under East Ger- 
man law, the contract would be valid at the officially permissible 
price and the buyer could reclaim his excess payments. The authors 
explain this distinction by the collective functions of socialist civil 
law: since the law is more interested in the "state's task to provide" 
(for all citizens) than in horizontal equity, it is content to leave the 
car with the buyer at a price acceptable to the authorities.30 But 
wait a second. We know that the seller would not have parted with 
his car at the lower official price. There is thus no reason to assume 
that at that price the car is more socially useful to the buyer than to 
the seller. Is it not much more likely that the state, having trouble 
in policing its price regulations, wants to offer a reward to that party 
most likely to blow the whistle? If that is so, the distinction has 
28. P. 375. In practice, even eviction of defaulting tenants is extremely unlikely. 
29. P. 378. 
30. P. 592. 
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nothing to do with the "providing" functions of socialist law or the 
"protective" functions of capitalist law but with the shortage of cars 
in the GDR and the resulting need for price regulations. 
Scarcity of consumer goods rather than ideological distinctions 
would also explain many other differences between East and West 
German civil law.3' And unless one wants to claim that such scar- 
city is inevitable under socialism and thus an inherent feature of the 
"system" (a possibility the authors do not address), there would be 
nothing particularly "socialist" about rules which, like war or post- 
war regulations in the West, take such shortages into account. Take 
the rules that East German sellers of defective merchandise (almost 
exclusively state-owned stores) may choose to repair the defective 
product rather than offer the buyer a price reduction or the chance 
to rescind his contract as under West German law.32 The authors 
explain this rule in terms of the societal interest in restoring the 
product's use-value in the cheapest possible way while still providing 
for the purchaser's socially acceptable needs.33 That sounds convinc- 
ing. But if there existed no shortage of consumer goods in the GDR 
at the time the new civil code was drafted and if no such rule al- 
lowing the state-owned consumer industry to unload defective goods 
upon reluctant buyers had been instituted, would that have made 
East German law any more "capitalist"? Or if-as the authors 
themselves point out-many West German suppliers introduce their 
right to repair rather than replace defective merchandise by way of 
contracts of adhesion,34 does that make West German law (which in 
this fashion, too, tries to keep down the costs of defective produc- 
tion) in any way "socialist"? Or is the crucial difference that under 
West German law the resulting savings are meant to benefit the in- 
dividual supplier, while under East German law they will benefit 
the state? But in the GDR, suppliers and state are identical. Are we 
to conclude that under both systems, civil law rules favor suppliers 
at the expense of consumers: either by providing state-owned sup- 
pliers with advantageous choices (as under the ZGB) or by providing 
private suppliers with the contract autonomy to introduce these 
choices themselves into their relationships with customers (as under 
the BGB)? This is a rather cynical conclusion which the authors 
certainly would not share, since they see East German civil law as 
much more caring and consumer-friendly than its West German 
counterpart35-again, in their view, a "socialist" feature resulting 
31. See, for instance, ? 222 para. 4 ZGB, dealing with the rent of appliances or 
tools from state-owned stores. If the rented object is returned before the contractual 
date of return, the customer is entitled to a prorated refund of his rent payment. 
Obviously, this rule is meant to encourage the early return and thus the more effec- 
tive circulation of scarce resources. 
32. ? 152 para. 1 ZGB. 
33. P. 428. 
34. P. 438. 
35. P. 408. 
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from the law's concern with societal welfare rather than with indi- 
vidual entitlements. 
But the different attitudes towards consumers manifested by 
the two codes (for which the authors offer a number of examples) 
could again be explained in other than ideological fashion. BGB and 
ZGB are three quarters of a century apart in age-no wonder the 
younger code shows greater social concern. Such concern is not nec- 
essarily absent under West German law; given the doctrinal confines 
of the old BGB, it just had to find different expression. When tack- 
ling the modern problem of products liability, for instance, West 
German courts had to respect the fact that, as a rule, no contractual 
connection exists between the producer and the purchaser of defec- 
tive goods and had to base damage awards on torts and on a reinter- 
pretation of evidentiary rules. The East German ZGB, on the other 
hand, could simply introduce the purchaser's right to claim damages 
from either producer or supplier with a stroke of the pen.36 But is 
this innovation "socialist"? Are the many other ways in which the 
ZGB has learned to leave behind the more cumbersome and scholas- 
tic constructs of the BGB37 (or, for that matter, the ways in which it 
has profited from solutions worked out by bourgeois judges and 
scholars)38 necessarily "socialist"? Even if the rules contained in 
both codes read quite differently, these differences need not at all 
have "systemic" significance. 
And conversely, if rules under both codes happen to coincide, 
does that necessarily mean that social conditions underlying the 
rules in question are basically alike? When noting the similarities 
between ZGB and BGB rules dealing with damage claims arising 
from repair or other service contracts, for instance, the authors refer 
to the "largely system-neutral character" of such services,39 by 
which they mean that the use of repair shops or dry cleaning estab- 
lishments involves sufficiently similar interests and problems on 
both sides of the border to be regulated by largely similar provisions. 
But that is not very persuasive. From a practical viewpoint, we 
know that the positions of customers of such services in East and 
36. ? 156 ZGB. 
37. For instance: the ZGB, predictably, has not adopted the BGB's complicated 
form of property transfer, according to which the transfer-agreement itself is in- 
dependent of the contractual agreement which gave rise to the transfer in the first 
place (Abstraktion von der causa). Under West German law, a transfer will be valid 
even if the underlying sales contract, for instance, turns out to be void. The trans- 
ferred object will have to be reclaimed under the rules of unjust enrichment. Under 
East German law, the validity of the transfer is determined by the validity of the 
sales contract itself: ? 26 ZGB. 
38. E.g., the ZGB, in ? 92 para. 2, adopts in statutory terms a doctrine which 
under traditional German civil law had been developed by case law in response to a 
gap in the BGB's rules on contracts: the concept of culpa in contrahendo. Under 
this doctrine, contracting parties have to compensate each other for reliance damage 
caused during the preparatory stages of their contractual relationship independent of 
whether a contract was later concluded or not. Cf. p. 287. 
39. P. 466. 
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West Germany are anything but alike: while a West German citizen 
can get his suit dry-cleaned from one day to the next, his East Ger- 
man cousin may have to wait for weeks. And from a theoretical 
viewpoint, it is also not self-evident that East and West German law 
should pursue similar goals in regulating such services. If socialist 
law is indeed more concerned with the satisfaction of societal needs 
than with the protection of horizontal equity, we would expect rules 
penalizing belated performance (because a need would not have 
been satisfied when it arose) but not necessarily sub-standard per- 
formance (because, as in the law of sales,40 a somewhat less-than- 
satisfactory performance might be sufficient to keep a citizen ade- 
quately provided for, by societal definitions, if not his own). 
But even if we could be persuaded of the "system-neutrality" of 
service contracts, some of the book's other examples of supposedly 
"apolitical" civil law rules would give us pause. When the authors 
state, for instance, that the ZGB's law of inheritance, in doctrinal 
terms, is very similar to that of the BGB because rules of succession 
"are largely politically neutral in their distributive functions,"'41 they 
themselves have second thoughts and point in a footnote to the very 
different economic significance of inheritance in the two states.42 
But we would have appreciated an explanation at this point telling 
us why, and under what conditions, economic differences are or are 
not reflected in differences in legal regulation. Our bewilderment 
grows if we are told that even property rules are "basically neutral" 
and that therefore "the legal construct 'property' is essentially iden- 
tical" on both sides of the border.43 Property? That crucial concept 
lying at the very heart of the confrontation between both ideologies 
should be regulated by ideologically colorless, basically fungible 
legal provisions? Why? And if that is the case, would we not have 
to conclude that the study of legal rules can provide no clues for dis- 
covering the social significance of law under different political 
systems? 
When surveying all the "systemic" distinctions between East 
and West German law which the authors have collected for us in 
their book, we are thus left in considerable confusion. Many rules 
are different under both systems, but not all these differences would 
necessarily have to be explained in political or ideological terms. 
Some apparently "socialist" rules could just as well be due to a scar- 
city of goods and resources which, in other times, have led to compa- 
rable rules in the West. Others may be the result of legislative 
experiences gained in the 75 years which separate the two codes. As 
the authors point out, many "socialist" ZGB provisions seem to have 
only symbolic significance. And in a number of situations, the dif- 
40. Cf. supra n. 32 and 33 and accompanying text. 
41. P. 788. 
42. P. 788 n. 2. 
43. P. 298. 
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ferences between East and West German civil law rules have no par- 
ticular significance at all. 
If, on the other hand, numerous civil law provisions are similar 
under the two systems, we again do not necessarily know what to 
make of that. Some may be similar because they are, in the authors' 
words, "system-neutral" and regulate interactions equally likely to 
be found on both sides of the border. Others are similar despite fun- 
damental distinctions between the underlying economic and social 
conditions. We are not told why some rules should be less suscepti- 
ble to ideological influences than others. It is obvious that socialist 
lawmakers themselves would claim that all their law is fundamen- 
tally different from ours. But how much of their claim should we 
believe? Do ideological distinctions lie primarily in the eyes of the 
beholder? Then this enterprise resembles the task of deciding 
whether a glass is half full or half empty. 
V 
My complaints about this book are really complaints about our 
branch of the profession in general. It may seem unfair to use this 
particular work to show how we comparativists tend to fail if we try 
to go beyond the merely descriptive. The authors are more inter- 
ested in the social importance of law, more skeptical even about the 
importance of rules in real life,44 than many of their colleagues. But 
if they fail nevertheless to develop a cohesive explanation of how 
and why socialist and capitalist civil law differ from each other, it is 
because they share the basic weaknesses of much work in compara- 
tive law today: a reluctance to theorize, a lack of critical distance, 
and an all-absorbing proccupation with doctrine. 
To accuse the authors of a shortage of theory may seem unwar- 
ranted to some readers. As shown earlier on, they do have very def- 
inite notions about what distinguishes East and West German civil 
law and reassert these notions throughout the book. To restate their 
view in their own words: Socialist law "is not perceived as an instru- 
ment to safeguard the equivalence of horizontal exchanges and to 
compensate for damages, but essentially as a means to secure the 
satisfaction of the material and cultural needs of the population."45 
This definition conforms, at least in part, almost verbatim to that of 
the ZGB.46 As the authors tell us themselves, it also is in line with 
Soviet definitions of civil law since the mid-1930s. Until that time, 
socialist legal theory had been dominated by Pashukanis' "legal ni- 
hilism", which saw not only capitalist law but all law as an essen- 
tially bourgeois category. Stalin replaced this politically dangerous 
doctrine with a new theory rehabilitating the use of civil law under 
socialism. The new view distinguished between capitalist private 
44. See especially p. 695 on the divergence between family law and family reality 
under both systems. 
45. P. 388-89. 
46. ZGB preamble, para. 2 at 3. 
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law and socialist civil law. Private law, protecting the economic au- 
tonomy of self-serving individuals, was necessarily linked to capital- 
ism and a market economy. But civil law, safeguarding the daily 
needs of consumers in the social as well as their personal interest, 
could safely be put to use under socialism.47 
Westen and Schleider accept the private law/civil law distinc- 
tion as a necessary "correction" of Pashukanis' earlier errors.48 In 
doing so, they also accept the claim that socialist law is indeed essen- 
tially different from its capitalist counterpart because it focuses not 
on individual rights but on collective needs. And throughout their 
book, they refer to the rights/needs distinction or the individual/col- 
lective distinction as evidence of the unique quality of socialist civil 
law. 
But to be persuasive, their argument had to be worked through. 
The authors could have done so on different analytic levels. In an 
abstract and theoretical vein, they could have taken issue with 
Pashukanis. For this purpose, it would have been helpful had the 
authors reminded their readers why the legal nihilists viewed all 
law, including laws passed by the new Soviet state, as bourgeois 
rather than socialist. Pashukanis49 defined law as a mechanism for 
coordinating conflicting interests and believed that only with the ab- 
olition of social conflict-or, as he called it, with "unity of pur- 
pose"50 between social actors-the stable, predictable rules of law 
could be replaced by flexible, technical regulations, "changing con- 
stantly as conditions change."'51 Until that blessed state, which for 
Pashukanis (as for Marx) presupposed a change in human nature, 
abundance of goods, and their direct distribution, law would be 
needed to mediate and temporarily reconcile the conflicting inter- 
ests involved in all exchange relationships. From this viewpoint, it 
makes no difference whether a contract is concluded between state- 
owned store and socialist customer or between private merchant and 
purchaser. In either case, the contract has the function of coordinat- 
ing the parties' conflicting interests. Furthermore, it owes its very 
existence to the fact that the parties' interests are not aligned but at 
odds with each other. Law in this view is essentially an egotistical 
category, reflecting social division rather than harmony. It would 
make no sense to speak, as the ZGB does, of a conformity of inter- 
ests between citizen and state.52 All civil law would necessarily also 
be private law. And any assertions as to the uniqueness of socialist 
law would be unfounded. 
The authors do not argue their jurisprudential case against 
Pashukanis. Nor do they argue their case on a more mundane em- 
47. P. 108 ff. 
48. P. 109. 
49. Pashukanis, "The General Theory of Law and Marxism," in Babb, Soviet 
Legal Philosophy 111 (1951). 
50. Ibid. at 137. 
51. Ibid. at 178. 
52. ZGB preamble, para 4, ? 14. 
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pirical level. They simply assert that socialist civil law differs from 
capitalist civil law because it pursues societal welfare rather than in- 
dividual protection. But this claim is neither self-evident nor self- 
explanatory. How can the law protect "material and cultural needs 
of the population" without also protecting individual rights? In or- 
der to know which needs to support, the law must distinguish be- 
tween acceptable and non-acceptable needs-between rights and 
non-rights. To be articulated, asserted, and possibly litigated, these 
rights must be assigned to concrete individuals-owners, buyers, 
landlords and tenants. It is difficult to imagine how it could be 
otherwise in a civil law system that does not want to police the satis- 
faction of societal needs with an army of public prosecutors. Civil 
law cannot treat the entire population as children in need of gui- 
dance and care. Nor does the ZGB attempt to do so: despite all its 
talk about social concerns and responsibilities, it takes legal notice of 
needs only if they appear in the shape of individual rights. Even for 
the ZGB, rights are thus an essentially egotistical category, to be in- 
voked by those who feel most strongly about them. Extra-statutory 
forms of state involvement in the enforcement of rights may well 
exist; but the authors, not going beyond the frame of the ZGB, do 
not tell us about them. So what are we to make of the supposedly 
different thrust of the two civil codes? 
Since the authors do not ask these questions, we do not get any 
answer. Their definition of socialist law remains on the surface, a 
description rather than a theory. And so it cannot do a theory's job 
and back up the authors' assertions against our doubts. I do not 
mean to say that Westen and Schleider are necessarily wrong; many 
of their observations seem plausible. But without a theoretical foun- 
dation for their arguments, they cannot really be right, either, and 
can convince us only by accident, not by the power of their analysis. 
It is not by chance, I think, that this long and thorough piece of 
work does not, as one would have expected, conclude with a sum- 
mary. Not having set out with a well-articulated hypothesis, the au- 
thors cannot, in the end, say: "See, we told you so." 
VI 
The book's second basic weakness, its lack of critical distance, 
follows from the first. A theory offers protection against the on- 
slought of data: it enables us to sort out the significant from the 
trivial, to order our information, and to question our own and other 
people's assumptions about it. Without such intellectual armor, it 
becomes difficult to resist the power of first impressions and to ques- 
tion ideological pretensions. A shortage of theory thus becomes par- 
ticularly critical when dealing with a subject matter as complex and 
as ideologically loaded as socialist law. 
I believe that it was this shortage of theory which caused the au- 
thors to accept the socialist distinction between civil and private law 
with as little questioning as they did. They also buy other socialist 
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phrases and definitions without much scrutiny. The book repeatedly 
uses the concept of a "unity of rights and duties" under socialism, 
for instance, without ever pausing to ask what this much proclaimed 
unity can possibly mean. If it means that rights are limited by du- 
ties (e.g., that my right as an owner is limited by my duty to pay 
taxes), this meaning would be nothing new and would imply no 
"unity" either: rights would still be viewed as opposites to duties 
rather than as their alter ego. If it means that rights and duties are 
identical (i.e., that my right as an owner obligates me to exercise 
ownership privileges), this meaning would not make much sense: a 
"right" ceases to be a "right" if it does not convey control over the 
territory it supposedly protects. Nor would this interpretation be 
supported by the ZGB, which in no instance compels a rightholder 
to make use of his rights. And if the "unity of right and duty" 
means that rights are conditioned upon the fulfillment of duties 
(i.e., that my rights as an owner are protected only to the extent 
that I exercise responsible ownership), this meaning might make 
some sense but is exceedingly risky and difficult to apply in practice. 
The ZGB, for instance, gives no positive definition of "responsible 
ownership" and requires an owner only to exercise his right within 
the limits of the law and with due respect for the legitimate inter- 
ests of others and of society.53 That sounds not like some mystical 
equation of rights and duties but like the quite conventional limita- 
tion of rights from the outside. It would take a careful investigation 
of doctrine and case law to find out what significance, if any, the 
shadowy concept of a "unity of rights and duties" actually has. Its 
facile acceptance and repetition, as if the term had some obvious 
meaning, will simply not do. 
This is only one example. There are many other instances in 
which the authors merely restate socialist claims without critical 
questioning. They talk about the "constitutional protection" of ten- 
ancy54 or of personality rights55 in the GDR as if constitutions in so- 
cialist countries, had the same functions as in bourgeois democracies. 
They refer on many occasions to the educational tasks of socialist 
civil law without investigating how this education is meant to affect 
people's behavior if it apparently operates neither with legal sanc- 
tions nor with legal rewards. And although more than once the au- 
thors express doubts about the actual effectiveness of the ZGB's 
admonitions, they nevertheless continue to accept the fact that so- 
cialist law tries to teach and admonish as evidence of its unique 
quality. But what are we to make of a legal system that belittles the 
concept of individual rights, but continues to use it or that insists on 
defining its law as a vehicle for ideological messages despite the fact 
that these messages seem to fall on deaf ears? 
53. ? 22 para. 3. 
54. P. 374; see Constitution GDR art. 37 para. 2. 
55. P. 626; see Constitution GDR art. 19, 30. 
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VII 
That brings us to the third, most serious shortcoming of this 
work: its confinement to doctrine. Since law, to the authors, is the 
law of the books, courts appear simply as applicators and executors 
of legislation. They have no life of their own. Westen and Schleider 
seem to take it for granted that case law (correctly decided case law, 
that is) will simply confirm the tenets of statute and doctrine. From 
this viewpoint it makes sense to use case citations, if at all, only to 
support some doctrinal interpretation. Decisions are never used to 
challenge the supposed meaning of the law. 
Take, for instance, their treatment of contracts which are void 
because they violate some prevalent notions of morality-"good 
morals" in West Germany,56 "socialist morals" in East Germany.57 
Here the authors claim, as a matter of fact, that "because of the dif- 
ferent value-judgments of the two legal systems ..., the interpreta- 
tion of the concepts ... diverges significantly."58 They see no need 
to cite any cases which support their assertion. But I am not sure 
that they could find very many. While in the early years of the 
GDR the "general clauses" of civil law were indeed used as conve- 
nient vehicles for judicial repression, case law since the mid-1960s 
has calmed down considerably. I would guess that decisions involv- 
ing truly political interpretations of ? 68 ZGB are extremely rare- 
that is, that East German judges very seldom adopt interpretations 
with which West German judges would disagree in substance and 
not just in language. Nor am I so certain that the authors are right 
if they claim-again, without any concrete evidence-that GDR 
courts are more likely to interfere with parental custody decisions 
after divorce than are their West German counterparts.59 Maybe, 
maybe not. In any case, these would have been good occasions to 
find out whether assertions about the different moral quality of so- 
cialist law are really more than mere verbiage. 
But the authors are so captured by the doctrine and language of 
both legal systems that they cannot break out and examine the im- 
pact of law on real life. They never seem to realize that it takes 
more than black ink and paper to construct a "legal system". Judges 
must have the time, the inclination, and the incentive to apply the 
civil code's exhortations in individual cases-but the authors never 
look at socialist civil procedure and its possibilities and constraints. 
Rights must be invoked or contested by real people if statutory 
value judgments are to be translated into social reality-but the au- 
thors never look at litigation rates or the distribution of plaintiffs 
and defendants in East German courts. What if civil law claims are 
only rarely litigated, if socialist consumers prefer administrative 
complaint procedures to court suits, or if the moralizing of socialist 
56. BGB ?? 134, 138. 
57. ZGB ? 68 para. 1 no. 2. 
58. P. 235. 
59. P. 761. 
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family law is undercut by people's private marital or extra-marital 
behavior? How much of the "systemic" distinctiveness of socialist 
civil law which the authors describe finds any reflection in the be- 
havior of socialist courts and their users? 
Even a careful reader of this long and exhaustive volume will 
get no real feeling for the importance of law in the life of ordinary 
East and West German citizens. He will put the book down with the 
vague impression that the two civil law systems pursue very differ- 
ent goals but that many of their statutory provisions, for whatever 
reasons, seem to lead to fairly similar results and that, in the end, 
the impact of civil law on the life of ordinary people is not all that 
different between East and West. The authors say as much when 
they claim that despite the "considerable divergences" in civil law 
doctrine both codes have "largely similar functions" in regulating 
the day-to-day relationships of citizens under the respective sys- 
tems.60 That result not only raises questions about the enterprise as 
a whole: what then is the importance of the "systemic" differences 
which the authors describe in their book? It also cannot possibly be 
true. 
Look only at some of the factual differences between the two 
legal systems. Adjusting for different sizes of population and 
workforce, West Germany has 3.4 times as many professional judges 
as East Germany; more than 6 times as many law students; almost 
20 times as many private attorneys. West German civil courts han- 
dle a caseload 9 times as large as that of their East German counter- 
parts, and West German employees are more than 7 times as likely 
to sue their employer than are their socialist colleagues.6' These 
figures suggest that law must play an enormously different role in 
the daily reality of the two states. We all know, from personal expe- 
rience, how important and omnipresent law is in our capitalist lives: 
people are quick to sue and court dockets crowded; lawyers are well- 
respected and affluent members of the community; a large percent- 
age of our elites have legal training, and even political disputes (in- 
volving issues like abortion or environmental concerns) are often 
battled out in legal terms. In East Germany, on the other hand, law 
seems peripheral and unused, an ideological artifact rather than a 
political life-force. Every socialist official talks about its dignity and 
authority; codes exhort its social concerns; scholars praise its collec- 
tive spirit; official legal propaganda campaigns try to persuade citi- 
zens of the need to know and follow the law. But these appeals ring 
hollow. Few seem to listen, and few use the law to protect their in- 
dividual interests.62 Despite its enormous ideological pretensions, 
socialist law seems to have captured the hearts and minds of ordi- 
nary people much less than its counterpart under capitalism. For all 
60. P. 66. 
61. See Markovits, "Pursuing One's Rights Under Socialism," Stan. L. Rev. (forthcoming). 
62. Id. 
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this, the book provides no explanation; it does not even give us an 
inkling of the greatly disparate weight of law as a social force under 
both systems. As an account of the significance of civil law in capi- 
talist and socialist society, it is profoundly misleading. 
Much of our comparative law research is similarly misleading. 
We talk about legal systems but not about the people living and 
breathing under those systems. We write about dogma, but cannot 
fill it with life. More than any other area of legal research, compar- 
ative law could be colorful, exiting, challenging, and mind-stretch- 
ing. It rarely is. 
How can we change? First of all, I think, we have to learn from 
the hedgehogs: pull our thoughts together, focus more precisely, 
think harder, become more selective about what is and is not impor- 
tant. We must stop behaving like registrars and start behaving like 
spies: search for vital information rather than record, index, and 
classify whatever data are available. When we ask questions, we 
must also ask why we (or anybody else) would want to know the 
answer. 
For that purpose, we must develop hypotheses and design re- 
search plans to know where to go and how to get there. Our intel- 
lectual temperament (and often, our civilist upbringing) tends to 
make us doctrinal; our allegiance to dogma, in turn, may give our ar- 
guments a semblance of intellectual order, the illusion of conceptual 
cohesion. But a successful argument needs a structure of its own, 
and we cannot simply borrow existing doctrinal frameworks (as the 
authors do in the book under review) to support our investigations. 
We need to develop our own intellectual tools and use them with 
more critical distance, more self-doubts, and less respect for the let- 
ter of the law. 
Above all, we must learn from other disciplines. Comparative 
law should offer unique possibilities to learn about other societies 
(and thus, incidentally, about our own) by looking at law as a mirror 
of social realities. Yet we tend to treat law as an independent, self- 
contained phenomenon, consisting of rules and procedures, but not 
of people who manipulate, apply, use, or disregard these rules. Our 
empirical efforts are minimal. Our contacts with the Law and Soci- 
ety movement are minimal. Our knowledge of economics is mini- 
mal. Despite their worldwide connections, comparativists are 
strangely parochial people-preferring to hang out with each other, 
publishing in their own, specialized journals, ignoring what else is 
going on in the world of legal scholarship. Take our conceptualism, 
for instance. We tend to take legal constructs seriously but in an un- 
reflected, superficial way: as necessary elements of any legal system 
which for that very reason are worthy of our attention. We might 
learn instead from our Critical Legal Studies colleagues, who also 
take concepts seriously, but not as phenomena whose reality and im- 
portance cannot be in doubt, but as crystallizations of consciousness 
which must be debunked and decoded to reveal their social implica- 
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tions.63 Unfortunately most of us are trained neither in empirical re- 
search nor in philosophical speculations. But we can learn. If we 
want to fill our books and articles with more life, if we want to un- 
derstand law as a truly humanist discipline and comparative law- 
even better, as a discipline which looks at human relationships 
across national and cultural borders-we must leave our safe world 
of codes and doctrines, forsake our encyclopedias and handbooks, 
narrow our focus, sharpen our questions, and take the plunge. 
63. See, for instance, Balbus, "Commodity Form and Legal Form," 11 L & Soc. 
Rev. 671 (1977). 
This content downloaded from 128.83.205.78 on Tue, 02 Jun 2015 19:08:48 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
